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Coming to Terms with Dred Scott:
A Response to Daniel A. Farber
Paul Finkelman*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TANEY OPINION AND THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
III. DID DRED SCOTT CAUSE THE CIVIL WAR?
IV. WAS THE CASE WRONGLY DECIDED?
V. WAS THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE CORRECTLY DECIDED?
VI. DID THE COURT OVERREACH IN STRIKING DOWN THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISE?
VII. WHY DO WE HATE DRED SCOTT?
I. INTRODUCTION
How does one argue against the proposition that Dred Scott is the
Court’s worst opinion? No one today likes the opinion or the result. Almost
everyone agrees it is a bad opinion. Chief Justice Taney’s “Opinion of the
Court” contains racist language, bizarre legal analysis, and tendentious
arguments.1 The narrow result—that Dred Scott was still a slave—seems so
wrong and unfair, and violates all modern notions of justice. Worse yet are
Chief Justice Taney’s larger holdings—that the Constitution protected
slavery, that Congress could not prohibit slavery in the territories, and that
blacks, even if free, could never be citizens of the United States. Popular
historians or non-reflective legal scholars would like to claim it caused the
Civil War. Professor Farber is so incensed by the opinion that he would like
to blame Chief Justice Taney for all the deaths in the Civil War—some

* President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, Albany
Law School. This article is a response to Daniel A. Farber’s A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott
Revisited and part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium,
exploring the most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history. Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of
Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13 (2011).
1. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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625,000—and then just for good measure raise the death total by nearly
twenty five percent, to an astounding 800,000.2
Professor Farber is of course a great advocate. He makes his arguments,
marshals his evidence to support his claim, exaggerates what the other side
says, and charges forward. I was astonished, for example, to learn from his
paper that I am now one of those who want to “rehabilitate” Chief Justice
Taney and his opinion.3 There is a huge difference between “rehabilitating”
the opinion of the Chief Justice, and suggesting, as I did in a recent article,4
that some aspects of the opinion were at least reasonable and that the
outcome—that Scott remained a slave and could not sue in diversity—was
probably legally correct.
So let me start by making it clear, I have no love for the opinion or for
Taney. On this issue I can safely take an oath like those of the McCarthy
era: I am not now, nor have I ever been a fan of Taney or the decision and I
have never tried to rehabilitate either. I stand foursquare with Senator
Charles Sumner “that the name of Taney is to be hooted down the page of
history.”5 Those scholars who like Taney the most—such as Carl Swisher6
and Felix Frankfurter7—always wanted people to believe that Dred Scott
was an aberration and that their Taney—the real Taney—was not such a bad
fellow. This is nonsense. Chief Justice Taney was thoroughly racist and
thoroughly pro-slavery. For most of his adult life he opposed any rights for
free blacks,8 and his jurisprudence almost always supported slavery.9 As
President Andrew Jackson’s attorney general, Taney argued that blacks
could never be citizens of the United States and thus were not entitled to
passports and other rights of citizenship.10 He of course repeated these
conclusions in Dred Scott. Taney’s Dred Scott opinion was the apex of his

2. Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13, 15
(2011). Farber uses this number in the penultimate paragraph of his introduction and also used it in
his oral presentation at this symposium.
3. See id. at 14.
4. Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” for the Defendant,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219 (2008).
5. Bust of Chief Justice Taney, CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1012 (1865), reprinted in
PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 221, 222
(1997).
6. See generally CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY (1935).
7. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY,
AND WAITE (1937); see also United States v. Int’l Union of United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567, 590–91 (1957) (framing Dred Scott as one
of “the rare occasions when the Court . . . has departed from its own practice”).
8. But cf. Timothy S. Huebner, Roger B. Taney and the Slavery Issue: Looking Beyond—and
Before—Dred Scott, 97 J. AM. HIST. 17 (2010) (arguing that early in his life Taney was not proslavery or hostile to free blacks).
9. See generally Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34
AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000).
10. SWISHER, supra note 6, at 154.
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thought, not a wrong turn taken late in life. During the Civil War Taney did
everything in his power to undermine President Lincoln and the war effort.
He was so opposed to black freedom that he started drafting an opinion on
the unconstitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation, even though no
case on the issue was before him. Taney was probably the staunchest ally
the South had in Washington. He never committed treason, as defined by
the Constitution, only because his jurisprudence and his attempts to weaken
Lincoln could not technically be considered “overt acts,”11 but his rulings
surely gave great aid and comfort to the enemy,12 and had they been carried
out would have severely undermined the war effort.
But, when thinking about Dred Scott, the issue is not how do we
“rehabilitate” the opinion. The goal of scholarship here is to understand the
opinion, place it in the context of its own time, and explain its enduring
significance. After that, we may praise or damn it, and rehabilitate it or
condemn it.
Farber argues that Dred Scott was illegitimately decided and that Taney
overreached in his attempt to solve the problem of slavery in the territories
in a single opinion.13 Tied to this we must also interrogate the claim implied
by Farber, and made by others, that somehow Dred Scott caused the Civil
War. The answers to these questions will not be found in a law professor’s
narrow analysis of the structure of the opinion.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TANEY OPINION AND THE DECISION-MAKING
PROCESS
Professor Farber attacks the legitimacy of the Dred Scott opinion on a
number of levels. He complains that Taney’s originalism is inappropriate,
that the outcome is “predetermined” and thus the opinion is illegitimate, and
that the decision is wrong—the worst in our history to fit with the theme of
this symposium—in part because it is tainted by the outsider correspondence
of James Buchanan.14 None of these critiques are very powerful in the end.

11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court.”).
12. See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (opinion issued
as a Circuit Justice); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 682–99 (1863) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) (Chief Justice Taney joined this dissent).
13. Farber, supra note 2, at 13.
14. Id. at 20.
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For a serious legal historian, the approach to Dred Scott cannot be an
unsophisticated analysis, such as Professor Farber’s comment that
comparing Taney’s originalism to the entire methodology of originalism is
like trying to understand vegetarianism by noting that Hitler practiced it.15
Such arguments may score points in a public talk, but they entirely miss the
point of scholarly analysis. Hitler’s eating practices had nothing to do with
either the theory of vegetarianism or the politics of his regime.16
Originalism, however, was very much a part of the jurisprudence—and the
pro-slavery jurisprudence—of nineteenth century jurists like Taney and
Joseph Story. Both vigorously applied a jurisprudence of originalism to
bolster slavery. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania Justice Story argued that the
Fugitive Slave Clause was a fundamental compromise at the Constitutional
Convention and that without it the Constitution would never have been
accepted by the delegates or ratified.17 The history of the Convention shows
that this is utterly incorrect,18 and in fact it contradicts Story’s earlier
assertions in his magisterial Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States19 that the clause was a minor part of the convention and a “gift” the
northern delegates gave the Southerners.20 Story may not have been a very
good historian, but that is true of almost every Justice who has ever used an
originalist approach.21 In Dred Scott Taney may in fact have been a far
better originalist than Story was in Prigg or than most modern Justices are
today. His research into colonial and early national law is impressive,
especially when we remember that it was done without modern libraries
(much less electronic searching) and also without law clerks. He applied his
historical analysis with vigor—perhaps a little too much vigor—but also
with some sophistication. Despite Farber’s comments, Dred Scott is in fact

15. Id. at 45.
16. One might of course argue that the analogy that Farber dismisses may be useful in showing
that it is possible to be a vegetarian (and presumably respect the lives of animals) while at the same
time condoning harming human beings. Thus, the hypocrisy of Hitler’s vegetarianism while
creating a regime that perpetrated mass murder and wholesale extermination of people might carry
over to modern animal rights extremists who commit acts of terrorism against scientists by blowing
up cars or firebombing homes and research facilities, while claiming they respect the lives of
animals, or anti-choice terrorists, who claim to be “pro-life” while murdering doctors and nurses and
planting bombs that indiscriminately kill bystanders. On violent animal rights activists see Ashmore
v. Regents of the University of California (Case No.: 2:10-CV-09050) (this case is currently pending
in the Central District of California).
17. Prigg v. Pennsylania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 540 (1842).
18. See Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice
Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 259–63.
19. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 676–77 (Da
Capo Press, reprint 1970) (1833).
20. See Finkelman, supra note 18, at 264.
21. Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989).
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a clear example of originalism in action, and his methodology is not nearly
as unsophisticated as Farber would like it to be.
Taney argues from an originalist perspective that slavery is protected by
the Constitution, at least in part because the nation was founded by
slaveholders who were intent on protecting their most important economic
and social interest. Similarly, he argues that blacks could not be citizens of
the United States because at the Founding they were universally treated as
politically powerless, degraded persons, who were “so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”22 These
arguments are not inconsistent with a sophisticated approach to originalism.
We may not like Taney’s conclusions and we may cringe at the deep racism
of his rhetoric. We can condemn him for this unnecessarily cruel and
offensive language. But that does not mean his originalism is totally off the
mark. On the contrary, many serious historians have demonstrated that
slavery was a central issue of the American Founding and that the
Constitutional Convention bent over backwards to protect slavery in a
number of ways.23 Moreover, in Taney’s own time many sophisticated
highly educated abolitionists, such as Wendell Phillips and William Lloyd
Garrison, read the history of the Founding and the original intent of the
Framers exactly the same way that Taney did. Garrison and Phillips
advocated that Northerners secede from the pro-slavery Union precisely
because the Constitution protected slavery and oppressed blacks.
It makes no sense to complain, as Farber does, that Taney’s opinion
“suggests, if nothing else, a determination to reach a predetermined
conclusion at any price.”24 After all, isn’t this true for virtually every
opinion that every judge writes? Does Professor Farber believe, or did the
late David Currie whom he quoted believe, that when a Justice sits down to
write an opinion he or she does not know where the opinion will lead, or
what the holding will be? When Chief Justice John Marshall sat down to

22. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
23. See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION, 1770–1823 (1975); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION]; PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed.
2001); DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765–1820
(1971); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S
CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION (2010); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760–1848 (1977).
24. Farber, supra note 2, at 14 (quoting DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 263–72 (1985)).
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write Marbury25 was he involved in an inner debate with himself over how
the case would come out? When Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote Brown26
did he wonder if he would uphold segregation, and only as he wrote the
opinion did he convince himself otherwise? Surely no one believes such
things. Does Professor Farber think that constitutional law decisions are the
result of the Justice looking into the sky for the brooding omnipresence of
the law,27 and then pulling down the right decisions to match the facts of the
case? I doubt it.
In trying to understand the importance of Dred Scott, it makes no sense
to attack the opinion merely because a famous citizen, who held no political
office at the time, communicated directly with members of the Court and
lobbied one Justice on how to vote. Farber condemns James Buchanan for
his letters to Justices Catron and Grier before the decision of the Court was
announced. He says it “represents perhaps the greatest example of
Executive intrusion into the Court’s deliberations in U.S. history.”28 He
asserts it is “an extraordinary case of presidential intrusion into the judicial
process. . . .”29 Whether this is true or not is unclear. At the outset, it is
worth noting that at the time of this “intervention” Buchanan was in fact not
the nation’s chief executive, but only the President-elect. Thus, it is not
technically an “executive intrusion.” But, this minor point of chronology
aside, we might ask, how did Buchanan’s correspondence with Justices John
Catron and Robert Grier actually affect the case?
As Farber notes, in late January Buchanan contacted his old friend, the
Jacksonian Democrat from Tennessee, Justice John Catron, to find out when
the decision would be announced.30 Buchanan was writing his inaugural
address—to be given in March—and he wanted to know what to say about
the pressing issue of slavery in the territories. Buchanan wanted to know if
the decision would be announced before his March inauguration so he could
comment on the case.31 This was a political ploy that in the end backfired,
because by endorsing the opinion before it was announced, Buchanan only
opened himself up to criticism of colluding with Chief Justice Taney. But,
Buchanan’s political maneuverings, and how they affected the politics of the
late 1850s, cannot be used as a reason for supporting or condemning Taney’s
opinion in Dred Scott.

25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote “[t]he common law is not a brooding
omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. Farber, supra note 2, at 39.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 40.
31. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 307, 311–12 (1978) (discussing the Buchanan correspondence).
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We can condemn Buchanan for the impropriety of asking what the
outcome would be. But, his asking surely did not delegitimize the decision,
or even affect the decision. It could only affect his administration.
Surprisingly, Catron replied to Buchanan, which was of course a violation of
judicial ethics, although not perhaps as great a violation then as it is today.
More surprisingly, Catron asked Buchanan to discuss the case with another
member of the Court, Justice Robert Grier.32 Like Buchanan, Grier was a
Pennsylvania Democrat. At this point in the court’s deliberations, Taney
was going to write the “Opinion of the Court” and the other four Southerners
on the Court had agreed to endorse it, although in the end each would write
his own concurring opinion. Two Northerners, John McLean and Benjamin
R. Curtis, were going to dissent. Justice Samuel Nelson of New York was
planning to write an opinion concurring in the result—that Dred Scott was
still a slave—but either rejecting or ignoring all of Taney’s holdings on
black citizenship, the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise, and the
power of Congress to regulate slavery in the territories.
Catron was concerned that no Northerners were willing to sign on to
Taney’s opinion. Thus, he asked Buchanan to try to persuade Grier to join
Taney’s opinion. Thus, the “executive intrusion” that Farber condemns did
not emanate from the “executive” (or actually the executive-elect). Nor did
it come from Chief Justice Taney. Rather, it came from the staunch Unionist
Catron.33
Justice Catron’s tactics and James Buchanan’s willingness to participate
in those tactics may seem unethical today, but this sort of behavior was not
clearly unethical at the time. Indeed, recent scholarship suggests that contact
between Justices and politicians, lawyers, litigants, and members of the
public were not uncommon at this time.34 In 1846, Justice McLean
discussed a pending case with Salmon P. Chase, who was an attorney in the
case.35 In 1853, Justice Curtis discussed ongoing litigation involving foreign
affairs with the Secretary of State.36 In 1856, Justice Nelson told a lawyer he

32. Id. at 311.
33. See the correspondence between Catron and Buchanan in Philip Auchampaugh, James
Buchanan, the Court and the Dred Scott Case, TENNESSEE HISTORICAL MAGAZINE, Jan. 1926, at
231 (including letters from Catron to Buchanan on February 6, 1857, February 10, 1857, and
February 23, 1857, as well as letters from Buchanan); see also 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES
BUCHANAN: COMPRISING HIS SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 105–13
(John Bassett Moore ed., 1910).
34. Rachel A. Shelden, The Taney Court and the Problem of Judicial Ethics in the Nineteenth
Century 2 (Nov. 2011) (unpublished paper presented at the American Society for Legal History
Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA) (on file with the Pepperdine Law Review).
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
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had won his case before the Court announced its decision.37 And while
Grier and Catron were talking to Buchanan about the Dred Scott case, Curtis
was telling his correspondents about the Court’s deliberations. Prominent
advocates before the Court—such as John Y. Mason, William H. Seward,
Reverdy Johnson, and Edwin Stanton—often socialized with members of the
Court and discussed pending litigation.38 Buchanan’s correspondence was
clearly within the realm of common practice at the time, although his preendorsement of the outcome in his inaugural address stepped over the line of
normal behavior.
Nor can this appearance of impropriety, as Farber puts it, really be an
argument against the logic of the decision. Surely it cannot be considered
unethical for a citizen to weigh in with a Justice on how a case should be
decided. Citizens have that right; it is the Justices who are supposed to
maintain a sense of judicial propriety and ignore what outsiders say. But, we
know that is not always the case. Was there “impropriety” in the summer of
1919 when Professor Zachariah Chafee lobbied Justice Holmes on the
meaning of free speech39 after his anti-libertarian decision in Schenck v.
United States?40 Chafee’s lobbying led Holmes to substantially revise the
“clear and present danger” doctrine just eight months later in Abrams v.
United States.41 Is Holmes’s brilliant and highly regarded Abrams dissent
less impressive and somehow tainted because a famous law professor
lobbied him to change his jurisprudence? After the Court’s outrageously
oppressive opinion in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,42 numerous law
professors wrote scathing articles condemning the case, and just three years
later Justices William O. Douglas and Hugo Black reversed themselves,43 in
part because of the “pressure” of academic criticism. Was this improper,
and is Justice Robert Jackson’s brilliant opinion in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, overturning Gobitis, somehow tainted by this
history? Is the logic of the Second Legal Tender case44 suspect because
President Grant purposefully appointed Joseph Bradley and William Strong
to the bench because Grant knew they would reverse the First Legal Tender

37. Id.
38. Id. at 9–12.
39. See Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24, 26–27
(1971).
40. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
41. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). For a history of this case see RICHARD
POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE SPEECH
(1987).
42. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
43. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871) (the Second Legal Tender case).
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case,45 and uphold the Legal Tender Act? Charles Evans Hughes, who had
been on the Court and would later return as Chief Justice, thought the
decision was one of the Court’s “self-inflicted wounds”46 because the Court
reversed itself within a year of the first decision. But, however much this
undermined the credibility of the Court, even Hughes did not believe the
final decision—upholding the use of paper currency during the Civil War—
was incorrect.47
The answer to all of these questions is of course a resounding no. So
similarly, we cannot attack the substance of the decision merely because
President-elect Buchanan corresponded with Justices Grier and Catron. It is
further worth noting that Buchanan’s correspondence had virtually no effect
on the outcome of the case. As I have just noted, Grier already agreed with
the result—that Dred Scott would remain a slave—before Buchanan wrote
to him. Grier was simply planning to sign on to the concurring opinion of
Justice Samuel Nelson, a New Yorker, who also concluded that Dred Scott
would remain a slave. Catron, who was from Tennessee, wanted Grier to
sign on to Taney’s opinion which already had a five vote majority, so that it
would have at least one Northerner supporting it. This maneuvering, and
Buchanan’s participation in it, had no effect on Taney’s Opinion of the
Court or on Dred Scott’s fate. Finally, we should remember that Grier’s
concurring opinion was pretty much meaningless, announcing in one
sentence that he agreed with Justice Nelson’s concurrence and in a short
paragraph concurring with Chief Justice Taney,48 even though in fact,
Nelson and Taney disagreed on the fundamental question of how to decide
the case.
After the decision was announced, Republicans, such as Abraham
Lincoln and William Henry Seward, alleged that the decision was part of a
conspiracy between, among others, Taney and Buchanan, and that before
Buchanan gave his inaugural address Taney told him what the opinion, then
still unannounced, would contain.
The Buchanan-Catron-Grier
correspondence shows that Lincoln and Seward were correct in alleging that
Buchanan knew the result before it was announced, even if they were wrong
about Taney being the Justice who compromised the Court’s integrity and
secrecy. Had the Republicans known about these letters, as scholars do

45. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) (the First Legal Tender case).
46. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS FOUNDATION,
METHODS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS; AN INTERPRETATION 50–52 (Garden City Publ’g Co. 1936)
(1928). He also stated that Dred Scott was one of these cases. Id. at 50.
47. See id. at 51–52.
48. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 469 (1857) (Grier, J., concurring).
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today, they would have been useful campaign tools in 1858 and 1860, but it
is unlikely that they would have substantially changed the nation’s politics.
Farber also makes an argument that Taney was somehow playing
politics to support Buchanan in his intra-party conflict with Stephen A.
Douglas over the Lecompton constitution in Kansas.49 The only problem
with this analysis is that the Lecompton constitution was not written until
September 1857, which was six months after the Dred Scott decision was
announced.50 Moreover, the controversy over the Lecompton constitution
did not emerge until the fall of 1857, well after Buchanan was in office.51
Buchanan and Douglas were rivals in 1856, but the break between them did
not come until early December 1857, when Douglas “stormed into the White
House to confront Buchanan on the ‘trickery and juggling’ of this
Lecompton constitution.”52 Indeed, at late as October, the governor of the
Kansas Territory, Robert J. Walker, believed that Buchanan would not
support the Lecompton constitution because it was “a vile fraud, a bare
counterfeit.”53 The break between Douglas and Buchanan, in late 1857 and
early 1858, was over the Senator’s opposition to Lecompton because it was
“fraudulent.”54 Douglas opposed the Lecompton constitution not because it
supported slavery—Douglas repeatedly asserted that he did not care if
slavery was voted up or down—but because the fraud and rigged elections
attached to it made a mockery of popular sovereignty. None of these issues
had anything to do with Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott.55
Thus, Taney’s opinion cannot be seen as the Chief Justice siding with
one Democrat—Buchanan—in an intraparty dispute with another
Democrat—Douglas—because in March 1857, the dispute did not exist.
Douglas, like Buchanan, accepted the legitimacy of Taney’s major point—
that Congress could not ban slavery in the territories. That was the essence
of Douglas’s position that the issue of slavery in the territories should be
decided by popular sovereignty. Other than the fraud tied to the Lecompton
constitution, the only dispute between Buchanan and Douglas was when
popular sovereignty could constitutionally take effect. Douglas wanted the
territorial legislatures to decide the issue, while Taney agreed with Buchanan
that a ban on slavery could only happen at the time of statehood.56 Farber
49. Farber, supra note 2, at 41.
50. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 2
(1992).
51. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 165–69
(1988).
52. Id. at 166.
53. Id. at 165.
54. Id. at 166.
55. See id. at 162–69.
56. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES
BUCHANAN: COMPRISING HIS SPEECHES, STATE PAPERS, AND PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE 105–06
(John Bassett Moore ed., 1910).
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says this means Taney was siding with Buchanan against Douglas. But, had
Taney reached the opposite conclusion—that the territorial legislature could
ban slavery through popular sovereignty—then Farber or someone else
would argue that Taney was impermissibly siding with Douglas against
Buchanan. Whatever Taney said would have supported one set of political
players or another. But this does not prove that Taney reached the
conclusions he did because he favored one faction among the Democrats
rather than the other.
Thus, when we look at Farber’s arguments about the illegitimacy of the
decision, they turn out to be not very impressive. Originalism was not an
unheard of interpretive tool, and Taney’s massive historical analysis of the
rights of blacks at the Founding was an impressive marshaling of evidence.
We might disagree with Taney’s conclusions. As an historian I would argue
he should have been more nuanced in his use of history. But, neither his
analysis nor his conclusions that most of the Founders did not contemplate
black citizenship were embarrassing or obviously wrong. Clearly most of
the Southerners at the Convention did not imagine blacks serving in
Congress, arguing cases before the Supreme Court, becoming officers in the
Army, or serving on federal juries. The earliest Congresses, in which a
significant number of Founders served, banned blacks from serving in
militia in the Militia Act of 179257 and banned them from becoming citizens
in the first Naturalization Act.58 This illustrates that a majority of political
leaders of the Founding generation did not see blacks as citizens, even
though free blacks voted on the same basis as whites in about half the states
when the Constitution was ratified.59 Taney’s argument that the Constitution
protected slavery was not novel, and it was not incorrect. As for Buchanan’s
correspondence with Catron and Grier, it had no meaningful effect on the
outcome of the case, although it did taint Buchanan’s own inaugural address.
But, that is an issue of politics, not jurisprudence.
III. DID DRED SCOTT CAUSE THE CIVIL WAR?
The idea that a Supreme Court decision caused the Civil War seems
patently silly. The Civil War resulted from secession. And Dred Scott was

57. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
58. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). See also Stephen A. Siegel, The
Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originialist Inquiry, 92 NW. U.
L. REV. 477, 521–22 (1998) (discussing Congress’s first Naturalization Act).
59. In 1787 free blacks could vote in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 573–74
(1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 560 (Pa. 1837).
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surely not the cause of secession. Secessionists and southern nationalists60
loved the decision. There is not, as far as I can tell, a single complaint about
Dred Scott in any of the southern declarations explaining secession. Had the
North seceded, we could argue that Dred Scott was a factor, since it was so
unpopular in the North. But, no Southerners were pushed out of the Union
by Dred Scott, which they loved.
The southern states claimed they were leaving the Union because they
had been denied meaningful access to the federal territories. The southern
states made these arguments despite the Court’s decision opening all of the
federal territories to slavery and the Court’s emphatic assertion that
Southerners had a constitutional right to take slaves into the territories.61
The seceding states argued that Northerners had effectively prevented them
from enjoying the rights Dred Scott gave them. Whether these assertions are
true or not is irrelevant; clearly southern leaders believed them to be true, or
at least believed that these claims were rhetorically useful to gain popular
support for secession. Furthermore, in their secession documents the
southern states point to the fact that Republicans and Lincoln had promised
to prevent the spread of slavery into the territories. In other words, Dred
Scott did not cause secession; rather, it was the Republican refusal to accept
the legitimacy of Dred Scott that helped lead to secession. Southerners left
the Union not because they disliked Taney’s decision, but because a
majority of Northerners refused to accept it. This is not the fault of Taney or
the Court.
A number of seceding states also complained that their citizens could
not travel into the North with their slaves. Southerners argued that the
Northern states were unconstitutionally denying their rights as U.S. citizens
under the Commerce Clause,62 the Full Faith and Credit Clause,63 and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.64 These complaints were based on cases
and statutes across the North which led to freedom for any slave voluntarily
brought into a free state by his or her master.65 The decision in Dred Scott
gave Southerners two reasons to hope that the Court would soon side with
them on this issue.
Scott’s master—the army physician Captain John Emerson—had taken
him to the free state of Illinois.66 Had Scott sued for freedom in Illinois he
might have won his liberty in the state court. Similarly, he might have won
his liberty in a court in the Wisconsin Territory when Dr. Emerson was

60. This is a term used for Southerners who wanted to create a separate southern nation, and not
for Southerners who were “nationalists” in favor retaining a unified United States.
61. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451–52.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
65. See generally FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23.
66. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 397.
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stationed at Fort Snelling. However, he failed to make a claim in either
place, and did not assert his right to freedom based on residence in a free
jurisdiction until he had been taken back to Missouri. The trial court in
Missouri upheld his claim to freedom in 1850, based on state precedents
dating from just after Missouri became a state.67 However, two years later,
in a blatantly political decision, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
trial court in Dred Scott’s case, rejected its older precedents, and declared
that it would no longer emancipate slaves who had lived in free
jurisdictions.68 When Scott was transferred to the late Dr. Emerson’s
brother-in-law, John F.A. Sanford,69 Scott was able to revive his case in
federal court, because Sanford lived in New York. Thus, Scott sued in
diversity, claiming he was a free citizen of Missouri, being illegally deprived
of his liberty by a citizen of New York.70
Assuming that the Court had jurisdiction in this case, and that Scott
could sue in diversity,71 a different Supreme Court could have legitimately
held that Scott gained his freedom when Dr. Emerson took him to Illinois,
and that once free he was always free. A different set of Justices might have
asserted that Scott had an equitable claim to freedom because he had in fact
been free since the early 1830s, and that the Supreme Court had the power
and the obligation to enforce this claim. Except for the issue of jurisdiction,
this would have been a plausible and constitutionally legitimate outcome to
the case. But, the Taney Court took the opposite view, on two separate
grounds. Taney and five of his brethren believed that Scott could not sue in
diversity and thus there was no jurisdiction to hear the case.72 Justice

67. See Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824) (holding that a slaveholder lost her right to her
slave by residing in Illinois). This case is discussed in FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra
note 23, at 217–23.
68. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852). This case is discussed in FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT
UNION, supra note 23, at 222–28.
69. The case name is Dred Scott v. Sandford because the Supreme Court clerk misspelled the
defendant’s name. The defendant, John F.A. Sanford, actually spelled his name with only one “d”
and not two. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE, supra note 31, at 2.
70. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 400.
71. It seems clear that free blacks were never “citizens” of Missouri before the Civil War, and
thus, Scott’s claim of diversity jurisdiction was problematic. I have argued elsewhere that it is
impossible to argue that, even if free, Scott was a citizen of Missouri. See Finkelman, supra note 4,
at 1219–52.
72. The vote count here is complicated. The four Associate Justices from the South (Wayne,
Daniel, Campbell, and Catron) all explicitly endorsed Taney’s conclusions on black citizenship. See
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 454–56 (Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 469–93 (Daniel, J.,
concurring); id. at 493–518 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 518–29 (Catron, J., concurring).
Nelson (of New York) denied the Court had jurisdiction on other grounds, and thus concurred with
Taney on the outcome of the case—that Dred Scott was still a slave—but not on black citizenship or
congressional power over the territories. See id. at 457–69 (Nelson, J., separate opinion). Grier (of
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Nelson, with Grier concurring, ignored the jurisdictional question on black
citizenship, and simply held that under the existing precedent of Strader v.
Graham,73 the Supreme Court could not question Missouri’s determination
of Scott’s status.74 Through either theory, Southerners gained a huge
jurisprudential victory.
The Taney position meant that no black—slave or free—could ever sue
in a federal court in diversity, and that except for a small number of cases
coming out of the District of Columbia, the territories, or admiralty
jurisdiction, it would be impossible for a black to ever assert a freedom
claim in a federal court. Under Taney’s opinion there would be no more
freedom suits by people like Dred Scott brought into a federal court.
Justice Samuel Nelson’s opinion was helpful to the South in two other
ways. By relying on the earlier holding in Strader, Nelson and Grier
reaffirmed that the Supreme Court would not force the slave states to give
full faith and credit to free-state decisions, statutes, and constitutional
provisions emancipating visiting slaves. This was a big victory for
Southerners.
Equally helpful to the South was the last paragraph of Justice Nelson’s
concurring opinion.75 Nelson was from New York, which since 1841 had
taken a very firm position of emancipating any slave brought within its
borders.76 Nelson was surely aware of the Lemmon case,77 then making its
way through the New York courts.78 That case involved Jonathan and Juliet
Lemmon, who in 1852 were moving from Virginia to Texas.79 The best
route was to take a steamboat to New York City, spend three nights there,
and then take another boat that would travel directly to New Orleans.80
Indeed, this was the only way to sail directly from the east coast to New
Orleans. In New York City the Lemmons were hauled into court for locking
up their slaves, which the trial court referred to as eight “colored persons.”81
The eight slaves were then freed and quickly went north to become colored
Canadians.82 An appeal to New York’s intermediate court was pending

Pennsylvania) explicitly concurred with both Nelson and Taney, which was logically impossible, so
presumably he agreed with Taney on the citizenship question. See id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring).
73. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850). This case is discussed in FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 271–78.
74. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452–54 (Nelson, J., separate opinion) (discussing Strader).
75. Id. at 468–69.
76. See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 131–36.
77. Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
78. See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 296–97.
79. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 566.
80. See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 296–97.
81. People ex rel. Napoleon v. Lemmon, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. (5 Sand.) 681, 706 (1852). See also
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 297.
82. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 297.
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when Dred Scott was decided.83 Everyone involved assumed the case would
eventually reach the U.S. Supreme Court and test the right of the free states
to emancipate slaves in transit. In their secession documents a number of
states mentioned this issue as a reason for secession.84 But, the complaints
of the secessionists on this issue were not a result of Dred Scott. Indeed, at
the end of his opinion, Justice Nelson strongly implied that when the
Lemmon case or some similar case reached the Court, the Justices would
support the slave owners. Thus, Nelson wrote:
A question has been alluded to, on the argument, namely: the
right of the master with his slave of transit into or through a free
State, on business or commercial pursuits, or in the exercise of a
Federal right, or the discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of
the United States, which is not before us. This question depends
upon different considerations and principles from the one in hand,
and turns upon the rights and privileges secured to a common
citizen of the republic under the Constitution of the United States.
When that question arises, we shall be prepared to decide it.85
This analysis makes clear that Dred Scott had absolutely nothing to do
with secession, unless one makes the argument that Dred Scott caused
secession because without it Lincoln would have never become a nationally
known candidate and thus been elected president. It is true that Lincoln rose
to prominence attacking the decision, but that hardly makes Taney’s
decision among the worst in our jurisprudence.
IV. WAS THE CASE WRONGLY DECIDED?
Professor White argues that one measure of a “Supreme Mistake” is that
the outcome is “pernicious.”86 In every other case discussed in this
symposium the “prosecutor” argues that the final holding of the case—the
outcome—was wrong and should have come out the other way. But, this is
not truly the case here. It is hard to argue that Dred Scott was wrongly

83. The appeal from the trial court would be decided in December 1857. See Lemmon v. People
ex rel. Napoleon, 26 Barb. 270 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1857), aff’d sub nom, Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y.
562 (1860).
84. By this time New York’s highest court had affirmed the original decision, emancipating the
slaves. See Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 632; see also FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at
296–332.
85. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 468 (1857) (Nelson, J., separate opinion).
86. G. Edward White, Determining Notoriety in Supreme Court Decisions, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
197, 198 (2011).
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decided. As I will sketch out below, it is truly difficult to determine how the
Court could have reached any other conclusion. Even Professor Farber
admits that the outcome—that Dred Scott remained a slave—is not
particularly outrageous.87 Farber seems to be simply arguing that the Court
should have reached this result on other grounds. In hindsight it is clear that
that would have been the most prudent way to act. But, as I will outline
below, Chief Justice Taney and his brethren believed that Taney’s sweeping
opinion would not only be accepted by most Americans, but that it was a
judicious and economical way of ending the divisive debate over slavery in
the territories.
Initially the Court was going to decide the case on very narrow grounds,
based on Strader v. Graham.88 Strader was a suit between a slave owner
(Graham) and the owner of a steamboat (Strader).89 The steamboat had
taken three of Graham’s slaves to Ohio, and they then escaped to Canada.90
Graham sued under a Kentucky law for the value of the lost slaves, and the
appeals of this case first reached Kentucky’s highest court in 1844.91 Strader
argued that the slaves had previously been allowed to go to Indiana and Ohio
where they worked as musicians, and thus they were free.92 If this were true,
then Strader had not harmed Graham because the three blacks were not
actually his slaves. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the status of
the three slaves was not at issue, and that even if they had been allowed to
visit the North, they remained slaves when they returned to Kentucky.93 If
the slaves themselves had sued in Kentucky they might have won, because,
since 1820,94 Kentucky courts had been freeing slaves who had lived or
worked in the free states.95 But, in Strader the Kentucky court was not
willing to rule on their freedom while they were not before the courts, and
thus Strader was held liable for the value of Graham’s slaves.96
Strader appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court where he again lost. In
Strader v. Graham the Court effectively held that the states were free to
decide the status of all people before their courts.97 Since the Kentucky

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Farber, supra note 2, at 163.
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
Id. at 83.
Id.
Graham v. Strader, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 173 (1844).
Id. at 174–75. See also Strader, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 93, 97.
Graham, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at 183–84.
See Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467 (1820); FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT
UNION, supra note 23, at 192.
95. As late as 1853, Kentucky would uphold the freedom of slaves taken to the North for a
number of months. See Ferry v. Street, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 355 (1853); FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 201–05.
96. Graham, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) at 187.
97. Strader, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 96–97. See also FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra
note 23, at 273.
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court decided that the three blacks were slaves, the Supreme Court could not
intervene.98 The facts of Strader were very similar to those in Dred Scott.
Like Graham’s slaves, Scott had lived in two free jurisdictions—Illinois and
the Wisconsin Territory (present-day Minnesota)—and he might have
sought his freedom in either place. Instead, he returned to Missouri where
the state court held him to be a slave. Thus, the Supreme Court initially
planned to simply affirm Scott’s status, based on Missouri law and the
precedent in Strader. Had the Court done this almost no one would
remember the case, and it would certainly not be considered one of the
Court’s worst decisions. The Supreme Court in Strader simply allowed the
states to decide the status of people living in their states. Had the Court
followed Strader, as the Justices initially planned, the Dred Scott outcome
would have been exactly the same as Taney’s Strader opinion. This was the
position of Justice Samuel Nelson’s separate opinion.99
Almost every scholar, including Farber, agrees that Nelson’s opinion
was legally and constitutionally legitimate and even correct. Even the
Republican critics of the opinion had no great problems with the part of
Nelson’s opinion which held Scott was a slave. Thus, we have the oddity
that Professor Farber would like to make Dred Scott into a “Supreme
Mistake” while admitting that the outcome is probably correct, or that it was
at least not unreasonable, and that under the laws and jurisprudence of the
time, that outcome was neither pernicious nor outside the realm of
constitutional legitimacy. I cannot imagine how a case can be a “Supreme
Mistake” if it ends with a correct result.
If Dred Scott was wrong—a “Supreme Mistake”—it cannot be because
of the narrow result. It must be because Chief Justice Taney’s reasoning
was supremely wrong, or because, as Farber argues, his opinion was
overreaching. The issues here are about Taney’s jurisdictional arguments—
his arguments about the territories, his arguments about race, and most of all,
his assertions that the Constitution was pro-slavery.
V. WAS THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE CORRECTLY DECIDED?
Modern Americans are probably most offended by Taney’s argument
that Dred Scott had no standing to sue because blacks could not be citizens
of the United States. This is a complicated question, and one in which
Taney probably overstated the case. Taney argued that at the Founding

98. See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23, at 272.
99. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 456–69 (1857) (Nelson, J., separate
opinion).
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almost all blacks in America were slaves, that those few who were free were
treated as second-class persons, and that they had “no rights” that whites
needed to respect.100 However, as Justices John McLean and Benjamin R.
Curtis noted in dissent, free blacks were allowed to vote in some states at the
Founding, and thus were presumably citizens of those states.101 Since
federal citizenship derived from state citizenship under the Constitution,
then some blacks, however few, must have been citizens of the United States
at the Founding. Taney would have been on much stronger ground in
asserting that in 1857 (at the time he was writing this opinion) that in some
of the Northern states and all of the Southern, free blacks were not citizens
of the United States because they were not citizens of the states in which
they lived. This was certainly true in Missouri, where free blacks had almost
no rights and many disabilities, and thus were surely not citizens. Thus,
Taney’s assertion that blacks could never be citizens of the United States is
an example of overreaching—although it does not affect the outcome of the
case or Dred Scott’s status.
However, it is also abundantly clear that Taney was correct that no
blacks were fully equal to whites at the Founding.102 Even where blacks
could vote, they were not equal. They were often barred from public
schools, the state monitored their movements, and they were even forced to
carry identification showing that they were free. Even in Massachusetts,
where blacks could vote on the same basis as white men, there were curfews
for free blacks, they were excluded from public schools, excluded from all
the state’s colleges, could not marry whites, and faced some differential
punishments. Even where blacks voted, it was clear that they only had those
rights which the white majority granted them. After 1800, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Tennessee completely disfranchised
blacks, while New York provided special requirements for black voters that
white voters did not have to meet.103 Taney may have exaggerated the
disabilities of free blacks at the Founding, and surely some blacks were
citizens of their states (and thus of the nation), but he did not overstate the
case for the vast majority of free blacks in the nation. As the refusal to
enfranchise blacks in a number of states at the Founding and the later

100. Id. at 404–05 (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 572–74 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See id. at 529–64 (McLean, J., dissenting).
102. For an overview of the limitations of black rights at the Founding, see Paul Finkelman,
Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS
L.J. 415 (1986), and Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063 (1993).
103. For a general background of the chronology of black rights in the United States during the
1800s, see Finkelman, supra note 102. New Jersey disfranchised blacks and women in 1807. Act of
Nov. 16, 1807, 1811 N.J. Laws (Bloomfield) 33 (amended 1875). Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
North Carolina disfranchised free blacks in the 1830s through new constitutional provisions.
Finkelman, supra note 102, at 420; Jacob Katz Cogan, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and
Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 489 (1997); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN,
THE FREE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA 1790–1860, at 110–13 (1943).
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disfranchisement of blacks show, Taney would have been on stronger
ground in simply asserting that for most of the nation—and for the
overwhelming majority of blacks who were in fact slaves—during and after
the Founding almost all blacks in the new nation were “so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”104
Taney was also clearly correct about Dred Scott’s citizenship. Scott
sued in diversity.105 That is, he sued in federal court on the theory that he
was a citizen of the state of Missouri and that the defendant, John F. A.
Sanford, was a citizen of New York.106 Clearly, however, Dred Scott was
emphatically not a citizen of Missouri, even if he was legally free. Free
blacks in Missouri—and in all of the other fourteen slave states—were not
citizens of those states.107 At every turn they were restricted—not merely on
the right to vote or hold office. Free blacks in Missouri and other slave
states had to pay special taxes, needed special permission to live in the
states, were unable to leave the state and return, and were denied access to
education—not merely public education, but any education. Most of the
slave states made it a crime to educate any blacks, slave or free. The slave
states prohibited free blacks from entering numerous professions or owning
certain kinds of property. Under some circumstances the slave states even
prohibited free blacks from legally marrying or raising their own children.
Because a marriage is a contract, no slave could ever be legally married,
even if the master provided a minister, a judge, or some other official to
perform a marriage ceremony. Marriages of slaves had no validity at law,
and the parties to slave marriages had no legally enforceable rights. As
Thomas R.R. Cobb noted in his authoritative treatise on the law of slavery in
1858, “[t]he inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage
contract.”108 Thus, a free black man married to a slave woman had

104. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 400.
106. Id.
107. The literature on the limitations of free blacks in the antebellum South is huge. All the slave
states had elaborate codes for the regulation of free blacks. The specific limitations on free blacks in
Missouri are set out in Finkelman, supra note 4. For the larger literature on the limitations of free
blacks in the South, see IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1974); FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 23; JOHN HOPE
FRANKLIN, supra note 103; MICHAEL P. JOHNSON & JAMES L. ROARK, BLACK MASTERS: A FREE
FAMILY OF COLOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (1984); JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE,
REMAINING FREE: MANUMISSION AND ENSLAVEMENT IN NEW ORLEANS, 1846–1862 (2003); and
Finkelman, supra note 102.
108. 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 242–43 (Univ. of Ga. Press reprt. 1999) (1858). See id. at 242–46 (detailing
the limitations on slave marriages).
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absolutely no control over his children or his wife. His wife’s master could
sell his children or his wife whenever he wanted. He could also forbid the
free black husband from even seeing his slave wife.109 All marriages
involving slaves were marriages in name only, and had no status at law.
Thus, Dred Scott’s marriage to the slave Harriet had absolutely no legal
validity.
Dred Scott, even if free, was certainly not a citizen of Missouri. Thus,
Taney was correct that the Court did not have jurisdiction in the case. Dred
Scott had no standing to sue. Taney surely overstated the limitations on
black citizenship because in a half-dozen or so northern states blacks clearly
had state citizenship.110 But, Taney was not entirely wrong in concluding
that for most purposes free blacks in the United States were not citizens and
had not ever been considered citizens.
There is yet another aspect of the citizenship question. If Dred Scott
was a citizen, how did he become a citizen? The Naturalization Act of 1790
prohibited the naturalization of blacks.111 Dred Scott was born a slave, and
clearly no one in 1857 believed that slaves were citizens. So how did Dred
Scott become a citizen of Missouri or the United States even if he had
gained his freedom by living in Illinois or the Wisconsin Territory? He was
not a native-born citizen and he had never been naturalized. There was no
legal theory that would have made Dred Scott a citizen in 1854 when he
filed suit in federal court. Thus, again, the issue is this: was Taney correct in
holding that Dred Scott was not a citizen and thus was unable to sue in
federal court? The answer is surely yes.
VI. DID THE COURT OVERREACH IN STRIKING DOWN THE MISSOURI
COMPROMISE?
The other major critique of Taney’s opinion involved the issues of
territorial governance and Taney’s holding that Congress could not ban
slavery in the territories. I agree completely with Professor Farber that

109. These same circumstances would have applied to free women married to slave men, except
that her children would have been free because she was free.
110. In 1860 blacks had the same voting rights as whites in five states: Massachusetts, Vermont,
New Hampshire, Maine, and Rhode Island. See Finkelman, supra note 102, at 420–21, 425. Blacks
with a sufficient amount of property could vote in New York, and blacks could vote in elections
involving appropriates for public schools in Michigan. Id. at 425 nn.g & i. By 1860, free blacks had
held elective or appointive office in Ohio, New York, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island. See Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American
Lawyers as Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161, 174 (1994); Finkelman, supra note 102, at 477;
see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1619–1895: FROM THE COLONIAL
PERIOD TO THE AGE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006). At a minimum, blacks
were citizens of any states where they could hold office or vote. But, the number of blacks in these
states was miniscule in comparison with the four million slaves and quarter of a million free blacks
in the South who had almost no legal rights at all.
111. See Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
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Taney’s assertion that Congress lacked a general power to regulate the
territories is nonsensical.112 It is poorly reasoned and absurd. It is an
embarrassing attempt to make an argument that should never have been
made. Even Justice Catron specifically refused to accept it in concurring
with the rest of Taney’s opinion.113 It was also an argument that Taney did
not really have to make. Taney’s narrower argument—that Congress could
not ban slavery in the territories—was much stronger.
Taney’s argument on slavery in the territories was coherent and
reasonable for 1857, even though we find it immoral and offensive today.
Taney argued that slaves were property—which everyone on the Court and
in Congress agreed was true. He also argued that the Constitution was proslavery. Republicans rejected this, as did some abolitionists, like Frederick
Douglass. But even most Republicans agreed that Congress had no power to
end slavery in the states where it already existed. However, almost all
Southerners agreed with Taney that the Constitution was pro-slavery, as did
radical abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips.
Many northern conservatives, from Democrats like James Buchanan to
former Whigs like Millard Fillmore, agreed that the Constitution obligated
the North to protect slave property in a variety of circumstances.114 Taney
argued that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the taking of private property
without due process of law and just compensation.115 Thus, he argued that a
law which took constitutionally protected property away from Southerners
merely because they entered a federal territory was not a legitimate law. He
wrote:
[T]he rights of property are united with the rights of person, and
placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act
of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who
had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law.116

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Farber, supra note 2, at 21.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383, 519–20 (Catron, J., concurring).
See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE (2011).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450 (majority opinion).
Id.
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If slaves were protected property under the Constitution—as Taney found, as
almost every white Southerner believed, as many northern abolitionists
reluctantly concluded, as many northern Whigs and Democrats accepted,
and as a huge number of modern historians assert—then surely it was a
denial of due process for Congress to pass legislation that took such property
away from masters without any trial, hearing, or other aspect of due process
of law. Even if Congress was on firm constitutional ground in banning
slavery in the territories, it was unconstitutional to confiscate this property
merely for the violation of the territorial boundary.
Dred Scott’s owner took him to a military base in the Wisconsin
Territory where slavery was prohibited under the Missouri Compromise.117
The Compromise was absolutely silent on what happened when slaves were
brought into the territory. There was no process for determining if there
were exceptions to the ban. One can imagine all sorts of ways that slaves
might have entered the free territory where some exception might be
necessary. One could also certainly imagine that any taking of slave
property under the Missouri Compromise required some sort of due process
hearing.
Finally, Taney’s decision went to the fundamental unfairness—from the
perspective of Southerners—of a ban on slavery. The national territories
were collectively owned by all Americans. There was something deeply
unfair about telling people in half the nation that they could not settle in the
territories with their most valuable and economically productive possessions.
Striking down the Missouri Compromise ended that unfairness.
Professor Farber argues that Taney overreached in striking down the
Missouri Compromise.118 It was unnecessary for the decision and surely
suspect since he had already determined that the Court lacked jurisdiction to
hear the case because Dred Scott had no standing to sue. One might,
however, view his conclusions on this issue as prudent and legitimate.
Taney could have dodged this issue, only to have it come up again in a few
more years. Judicial economy, if nothing else, dictated that Taney deal with
the territorial issue and remove it from the political debate. Beyond that,
Taney’s decision made great political sense at the time. The nation wanted a
final answer that would end the divisive and seemingly interminable debate
over slavery in the territories. Taney hoped to do this in a way that was
entirely consistent with American politics at the time.
In 1820, in the Missouri Compromise, Congress banned slavery in most
of the western territories.119 With the exception of the formal organization

117. Id. at 394; see also Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (1820).
118. Farber, supra note 2, at 19.
119. Missouri Compromise §§1–8.

70

[Vol. 39: 49, 2011]

Coming to Terms with Dred Scott
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

of the Oregon Territory in 1848,120 the passage of the Missouri Compromise
was the last time Congress ever limited slavery in the territories until the
Civil War. After 1820 Congress annexed Florida and Texas, allowing
slavery in both. In 1850 Congress allowed slavery in all the new territories
acquired from Mexico, except California, which entered the Union as a free
state.121 The status of slavery in California was not dictated by Congress;
however, it was consistent with the wishes of the settlers.122 In 1854
Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise for all the territory left from
the Louisiana Purchase except Minnesota, where Dred Scott had lived.123
When the Court heard Dred Scott, slavery was legal in every federal territory
except Minnesota and the Oregon country (modern day Oregon,
Washington, and part of Idaho). These were the only territories that Taney’s
opinion affected. Congress had already allowed slavery in all of the rest of
the West. In 1856 the new Republican party ran a popular national hero,
John C. Frémont, for president on a ticket that promised to ban slavery in the
territories. 124 This party lost. Thus, for Taney, the ruling on slavery in the
territories simply reaffirmed what Congress had done in 1850 and 1854, and
what the electorate had decided in 1856. In this context, was it so
outrageous for Taney to conclude that Congress could not ban slavery in the
few remaining territories?
As early as the 1840s, members of Congress had been suggesting that
the Supreme Court decide the issue of slavery in the territories. This idea
began not with a pro-slavery Southerner, but with a moderate northern
Democrat, Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan, who represented the most

120. The act establishing the Oregon Territory in 1848 applied the Northwest Ordinance to the
territory, and thus by implication banned slavery there. Act of Aug. 14, 1848, 9 Stat. 323. Almost
everyone in the nation believed that Oregon was effectively, although not explicitly, covered by the
Missouri Compromise, and thus extending the ban on slavery in the Northwest Ordinance was a
more or less pro forma implementation of what everyone at the time assumed to be the rule for
Oregon. Given the territory’s distance from the South—it was further away from the South than any
other territory—it is not surprising that Congress did this, even though at the time the South had a
majority in the Senate and there was a pro-slavery southern president—James K. Polk—in the White
House.
121. For a discussion of the passage of the Compromise of 1850 and its implications for slavery,
see FINKELMAN, supra note 114, at 101–25.
122. Paul Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV.
845, 857 (2011).
123. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277.
124. Republican Party Platform of 1856, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29619#axzz1bZcmd029 (last visited Nov. 11,
2011).
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racially progressive state in the Midwest.125 By 1857 there was strong
support for a constitutional decision that would take the divisive issue off of
the political table. Taney accepted the challenge. It may have been a
mistake to do so, but it was hardly outrageous.
VII. WHY DO WE HATE DRED SCOTT?
So, why do we hate Dred Scott? Why is it the most despised case in our
constitutional canon? Why does Professor Farber so vigorously argue that it
is our worst decision?
I think the answer is that we hate Dred Scott because it was in fact far
closer to the truth than we want to admit. Taney described the Founding as a
period when blacks were considered “beings of an inferior order, and
altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political
relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect.”126 We hate the decision because it is embarrassing to
remember that we had a pro-slavery constitution. Farber asserts that Taney
was reading “his own racism into the Constitution.”127 But he was not doing
this. The racism was there at the Founding, as well as in 1857. Taney was
merely reminding the nation that the Constitution was a slaveholder’s
constitution, and that the United States was a slaveholder’s republic. Since
1788, with the exception of John Adams and John Quincy Adams, every
president had been a slaveholder or a northern doughface—a northern man
with southern principles. With the exception of about five years in the late
1820s and early 1830s, Southerners were a majority on the Supreme Court.
Pro-slavery men dominated cabinets and Congress. Blacks had voted in a
number of states on the same basis as whites in at the founding and in the
1790s. But in four of those states blacks had lost those rights.128 We are
uncomfortable admitting that in 1857 the value of slaves in the United States
exceeded the value of any other type of private property except real estate.
We do not like to admit—we would rather forget—that in the history of the
Supreme Court leading up to Dred Scott, only two Justices—Gabriel Duvall
and John McLean—had ever spoken out in favor of the rights of free blacks

125. See Roy E. Finkenbine, A Beacon of Liberty on the Great Lakes: Race, Slavery, and the Law
in Antebellum Michigan, in THE HISTORY OF MICHIGAN LAW 83 (Paul Finkelman & Martin J.
Hershock eds., 2006) (highlighting Michigan’s status as a “beacon of liberty”).
126. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
127. Farber, supra note 2, at 31.
128. Blacks had voted in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina at the Founding but later
lost that right; in New York blacks voted on an equal basis with whites, but after 1821 the state
maintained a property requirement for black voters but not white voters. Blacks voted in Tennessee
when it became a state in 1796 but also lost that right in the 1830s. See generally Finkelman, supra
note 102.
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and against slavery in a Supreme Court opinion.129 These were always
Except for a few minor cases, usually involving the
dissents.130
interpretation of state law, the Supreme Court had always sided with slavery,
not freedom. Even the famous Amistad case131 was not about black freedom,
but about the interpretation of a treaty with Spain, and the correct
understanding that the Africans on the ship were never legally slaves. We
conveniently ignore, as Steven Spielberg did in his movie,132 that Justice
Joseph Story ordered that the slave cabin boy on the ship be returned to his
Cuban master. We forget that Chief Justice Marshall upheld the legality of
the African slave trade133 and that Justice Story ruled that the free states had
no constitutional right to pass any legislation to protect free blacks from
kidnapping or mistaken seizure under the Fugitive Slave Law.134
We don’t like Taney’s opinion because it reflects, far more than we
want to admit, the kind of constitution we had and the kind of country we
had created. We wish to forget that the Constitution made slavery
impregnable from abolition by political means. If nothing else, the
requirement that three-quarters of the states ratify any amendment gave the
slave states a perpetual guarantee that slavery could never be abolished by
the national government. Had eleven slave states never seceded, to this day
it would be impossible to end slavery by constitutional amendment.135
Lincoln effectively attacked Dred Scott by arguing that it would lead to
a nationalization of slavery: “We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the
people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free; and we shall
awake to the reality, instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a

129. A number of Justices had attacked the African slave trade in opinions; but, this commerce
was easily distinguished from slaveholding itself. See for example, Justice Marshall’s assertion in
The Antelope, that while the African slave trade was “contrary to the law of nature,” it was
“consistent with the law of nations,” and “cannot in itself be piracy.” 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 96,
120, 122 (1825).
130. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 659–74 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting);
Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 298–99 (1813) (Duvall, J., dissenting). On McLean’s
antislavery, see Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519 (2009).
131. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
132. See AMISTAD (Dreamworks SKG 1997).
133. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 66 (1825) (“The African slave trade is contrary
to the law of nature, but is not prohibited by the positive law of nations.”).
134. See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625–26.
135. In 1860 there were fifteen slave states. To outvote them would have required a sixty state
union.
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slave State.”136 This was not unreasonable, given the political winds of the
age. Lincoln helped reverse those winds, and rode his critique of Dred Scott
to the White House. Because we venerate Lincoln—and properly so—we
tend to buy his argument that Dred Scott was constitutionally wrong. Yet, at
most, it constituted overreaching and an idiotic reading of the territories
clause that was utterly unnecessary for the outcome or for any of the big
constitutional questions that Taney tried to settle.
One final thought. My goal is not to rehabilitate Dred Scott, or Chief
Justice Taney, but to place Dred Scott in its historical and constitutional
context. Yet, there may be a silver lining in Dred Scott that we should
consider. In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney held that the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights applied to all federal jurisdictions—that the Constitution
follows the flag. Sadly, the United States Supreme Court failed to follow
this idea in the wake of the Spanish-American War. In the Insular Cases the
Court held that the Constitution did not apply to the newly acquired
territories, populated by the “colored people” in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the
Philippines.137 Perhaps today, in 2011, it is worth revisiting Dred Scott to
consider whether the Bill of Rights ought to apply to Guantanamo and other
places where the flag flies.

136. Abraham Lincoln, “A House Divided”: Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 16, 1858),
reprinted in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461, 467 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2d ed.
1953) (emphasis in the original).
137. For more on the Insular Cases, see Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment
of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283 (2007). See also Melvin I. Urofsky &
Paul Finkelman, 2 A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
591–614 (3d ed. 2011).
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